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Abstract
  The objective of this paper is to explore whether institutions  provide a missing link between 
economic growth and reduction in poverty. Institutions are deﬁned as “the rules of the game in
a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. 
The paper uses the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations system as the 
appropriate analytical framework. Using a fairly large sample the paper provides evidence that 
conﬁrmsthatimprovementsininstitutionsareexpectedtoreducepovertyinastatisticallysigniﬁcant
fashion. The explanatory power of the estimated models, however, is very low. Taking account of 
the interaction between institutions and the level of development increases power of explanation. 
Moreover, the results show that the relationship between improvement in institutions and poverty 
depends on the stage of development. 
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1I. Introduction
  Over the past twenty years or so the importance of institutions for development has attracted 
a lot of attention. In view of this it is perhaps not surprising that the World Development Report 
2002 has focused on  “Building Institutions for Markets”. According to the WDR market-supporting 
institutions perform one or more of three functions: easing or restricting the ﬂow of information;
deﬁning and enforcing property rights; and, increasing or decreasing competition. Facets of weak
institutions  include  tangled  laws,  corrupt  courts,  biased  credit  systems,  and  elaborate  business 
registration requirements. These facets, it is claimed, hinder development and hurt poor people. 
  While the focus of the report is narrow, the recommended principles to guide policy making 
in building more effective institutions are couched in very cautious, and generally acceptable, terms. 
According to the report to ensure effective institutions: (a) design them “to complement what exists- 
in terms of other supporting institutions, human capabilities, and available technologies.... ‘Best’ 
practice in institutional design is a ﬂawed concept”; (b) innovate “to identify institutions that work-
and those that do not”; (c) connect “communities of market players through open information ﬂows
and open trade”; and,  (d) promote “competition among jurisdictions, ﬁrms and individuals” (World
Bank (2002: 4 -5)).                  
  The most common understanding of “institutions” in the empirical literature is due to North 
(1990). According to North (1990: 3-5) institutions “are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change 
shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change”. 
According to this understanding institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise 
to shape human interaction. These constraints could be formal (such as the rules devised by human 
beings) or informal (such as conventions or codes or customs). Institutions affect the performance of 
the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production1.
  Building relevant institutions, it is generally recognized, is part and parcel of the development 
process. It is also generally recognized that institutions evolve over long periods of time in response 
to the demands of social, political and economic interactions. The evolutionary processes involved are 
inﬂuenced by the history and culture of the societies concerned. In the context ofAfrica an important
historical  inﬂuence on the long-term evolutionary process of institutions has been the colonial
encounter. As will be shown, there is evidence to suggest that where the colonial powers decided 
to settle they devised what is now called “market-supporting” institutions while where they decided 
not to settle they opted for “extractive institutions”. Colonial institutions, it is argued, persisted to 
the post-colonial period. It will also be shown that, based on various deﬁnitions of institutions, Sub-
Saharan Africa is characterized by very weak institutions.
  The objective of this paper is to explore whether institutions, appropriately deﬁned, provide a
missing link between economic growth and reduction in poverty. Perhaps the best way of appreciating 
the  importance  of  the  issue  under  investigation  is  to  place  it  in  the  context  of  the  Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations system. According to the United Nations (UN) the 
“development goals set out in the Millennium Declaration express the resolve of the world’s political 
leaders to free their fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of 
extreme poverty, to make the right to development a reality for everyone, and to free the entire human 
race from want” (UN (2002: 8)). The “right to development” is an example of “institutions”, or better 
still is an aspect of “institutions”.  
2  As is well known the ﬁrst Millennium Development Goal (MDG) is eradication of extreme
poverty and hunger2. The ﬁrst target under this goal, and the most studied target, is to halve the
proportion of people living in extreme poverty (living on less than US$1.08 per person per day) by 
the year 2015, starting from the level of extreme poverty of 1990. As is well known, the proportion 
of people living in extreme poverty is the head count ratio, a measure for the spread of poverty; 
while the income level of US$ 1.08 per person per day is the poverty line, a threshold below which 
people are deemed to be poor. Three indicators have been selected to reﬂect progress in achieving this
target. These include the head-count ratio itself, the poverty gap ratio and the share of the poorest 20 
percent of the population in national consumption (i.e. the share of the poorest quintile). It can easily 
be shown that reducing the spread of poverty by half by the year 2015, with 1990 as the base year, 
requires an annual rate of reduction of the head-count ratio by about 2.7345 percent. On the basis of 
such a required rate of reduction of the head-count ratio a corresponding rate on growth of per capita 
GDP can be calculated. This required rate of growth for poverty reduction depends crucially on the 
structural features of poverty in the various countries. An aggregative indicator of these structural 
features is the growth elasticity of poverty. As far as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is concerned, given 
the structural features of its poverty as well as past growth performance, it has been shown that the 
attainment of the ﬁrst MDG will not be feasible3. 
  Over the past ﬁveyearssincetheirformulationtheMDGsprovidedamuchneededdevelopment
framework for least developed countries. As a result it is not surprising to ﬁnd that the recentAfrican
initiative of launching a New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is closely related to the 
MDGs. As will be argued NEPAD adopted the “eradication of poverty” as the overarching objective 
of development in the continent. The priority areas of NEPAD deal with the institutional pre-requisites 
for achieving the overarching objective of development. 
  Having noted the above, the remainder of this paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Section (II) 
reviews the various deﬁnitions of “institutions” and their use in cross-country growth regressions.
Section (III) presents an analytical framework of poverty analysis in the context of which the search 
for the missing link can be conducted, while section (IV) provides empirical evidence on growth and 
institutions in SSA, on poverty levels and trends, and on the link between institutions, growth and 
poverty. Section (V) deals with the implications of the results for the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) while section (VI) concludes.
II. Institutions and Economic Growth
2.1. Measuring Institutions
  A careful reading of the relevant literature shows that  three quantitative measures of institutions 
could be identiﬁed. Despite being quantitative all of these measures are subjective in nature in view
of the fact that they are based on perception surveys.  Most of these measures are used in the political 
economy literature dealing with issues of governance, though some of them were speciﬁcallydesigned
for assessing the overall investment climate in countries around the world or the overall economic 
performance of countries4.    
a) Freedom House Measures: It is by now generally accepted that development is brought about in 
the context of developmentally oriented societies. A recent consensus seems to have emerged on the 
major features of an ideal growth and development society. Such a society is seen as one which: (a) 
would know how to operate, manage, and build the instruments of production and to create, adapt 
and master new techniques on the technological frontier; (b) would be able to impart this know-
how to the youth by formal education or by apprenticeship; (c) would employ, promote and demote 
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collective enterprise and encourage initiative, competition and emulation (see, for example, Landes 
(1998)). Such ideal societies are said to have social and political institutions that would secure 
rights of private property and personal liberty; enforce contracts; provide stable, responsive, honest, 
transparent and accountable governments; allow for social and geographic mobility; and evolve a 
more equal distribution of income supporting a large middle class. Thus the above deﬁnition, based on
economic history, makes it very clear that institutions are central to the ideal growth and development 
societies.
  The above requirements for the ideal growth and development societies can be looked at in 
terms of the political freedom indicator produced by Freedom House. This is a composite indicator 
composed of two measures of political rights and civil liberties. These measures are scored on a scale 
ranging from unity (for “free” status) to 7 (for “not free” status). The composite indicator is the average 
of the two scores. The political rights component measures the extent to which a government is chosen 
by means of free and fair elections of representatives of the people. The civil liberties component 
measures the extent of freedom from government oppression and covers four broad categories of 
freedoms: “freedom of expression and belief”, “association and organization rights”, “rule of law and 
human rights”, and, “personal autonomy and economic rights”. Averaging over the two components 
countries are classiﬁed into freedom status such that a country is judged “free” if the average freedom
score is in the range 1-2.5, “partly free” if the score is in the range 2.5-5.5, and “not free” if the average 
score is greater than 5.5. Freedom indicators have been compiled since the early 1970s. 
  The freedom scores can be used as proxy measures for institutions with higher values indicating 
weak institutions. Table (1) summarizes the evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa in the form of averages 
for sub-periods covering the period 1972-2004, where ﬁgures between brackets are the average
freedom scores.  
Table (1): Freedom Score and Freedom Status in Africa 1972-2004 
Details 1972-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004
Number of Countries 45 46 48 48 48
Average Freedom Score 5.49 5.59 5.16 4.50 4.33
Number of Countries Free: 2 (2.25) 2 (2.41) 2 (1.92) 7 (1.80) 9 (1.94)
Number of Countries Partly Free: 17 (4.69) 19 (4.82) 26 (4.70) 30 (4.44) 28 (4.38)
Number of Countries Not Free: 26 (6.26) 25 (6.43) 20 (6.09) 11 (6.40) 11 (6.14)
Source: Compilation based on Freedom House (2004).
  Generally, the table shows that the region has achieved some progress in terms of freedom over 
the period 1972 to 2004. This is indicated by the reduction in the freedom score from an average of 
about 5.5 during 1972-1975 to an average of 4.33 for the period 2001-2004, thus indicating a movement 
from a status of being “not free” to that of being “partly free”. This progress is also indicated by the time 
trend of the number of countries classiﬁedbyfreedomstatus.Thusthenumberofcountriesclassiﬁedas
“free” has increased from 2 in 1972-1975 to 9 in 2001-2004, while the number of those classiﬁedas“not
free” has declined from 26 during the ﬁrs period to 11 during the last period.    
4b) ICRG Measures: In the empirical growth literature “institutions” are looked at in terms of a 
number of measures reported by the Political Risk Services Group (PRS) that constructs the famous 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). These measures are closely related to North’s deﬁnition
noted in the introduction. The ICRG risk rating system assigns a numerical value (called risk points) 
to a predetermined range of risk components according to a preset weighted scale for each country. 
Each scale is designed to award the highest value to the lowest risk and the lowest value to the highest 
risk. 
  The most important measures of the quality of institutions, frequently used in the empirical 
literature, are the “government repudiation of contracts”, “expropriation”, “corruption”, the “rule of 
law”, and the “quality of the bureaucracy”. The “government repudiation of contracts”, scored from 
zero to ten, is a measure of the risk of a government modifying a contract by repudiating, postponing, 
or scaling it down due to budget cuts, domestic pressures, change in government, or a change in 
domestic circumstances and priorities; “expropriation”, scored from zero to ten, is a measure of the 
risk of outright conﬁscation or forced nationalization; “corruption”, scored from zero to six, is a
measure of the degree of corruption by high government ofﬁcials in terms of demanding special
payments for discharging their ofﬁcial duties and in terms of illegal payments at lower levels of
government; the “rule of law”, scored from zero to six, is a measure of the extent to which there are 
sound political institutions, strong court systems and orderly succession of power); and the “quality of 
the bureaucracy”, scored from zero to six, is a measure of the degree of autonomy of the civil service 
from political pressures, government policy continuity and the fairness of the recruitment process to 
civil service positions.  
  In an important contribution to the empirical growth literature Hall and Jones (1997) use the 
above ICRG categories to construct a composite measure of what they term “social infrastructure”. 
“Social infrastructure” is supposed to quantify the wedge between the private return to productive 
activities and social returns to such activities. A good “social infrastructure” ensures that these returns 
are kept closely in line across the range of activities in the economy; and a possible composite 
measure of social infrastructure is one that takes into account government anti-diversion policies 
and openness to trade (Hall and Jones (1999: 97)). According to their interpretation two of the ICRG 
“categories relate to the government’s role in protecting against private diversion: (i) law and order, 
and (ii) bureaucratic quality. Three categories relate to the government’s possible role as a diverter: (i) 
corruption; (ii) risk of expropriation, and (iii) government repudiation of contracts. Our variable is an 
equal weighted average of these ﬁve variables, each of which has higher values for governments with
more effective policies for supporting production. The index is measured on a scale from zero one” 
(Hall and Jones (1999: 97-98)). 
 
  Another important contribution to the empirical growth literature uses an index of protection 
against expropriation as a measure of institutions. The index varies “between 0 and 10 for each country 
and year, with zero corresponding to the lowest protection against expropriation. This measure is 
appropriate for our purposes since the focus here is on differences in institutions originating from 
different types of states and state policies. We expect our notion of extractive state to correspond to 
a low value of the index, while the tradition of rule of law and well-enforced property rights should 
correspond to high values” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001: 1377-1378)). For the purposes 
of cross-country regressions the average value of the index between 1985 and 1995 is used. 
  Despite  having  been  compiled  since  the  early  1980s  the  ICRG  categories  of  “risk  of 
expropriation”, and “government repudiation of contracts” are not easily accessible. Other ICRG 
categories can be downloaded from PRS website. In a recent paper on foreign aid and institutions 
Brautigam and Knack (2004) used a composite measure of institutions based on three such ICRG 
categories: bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and corruption. As noted earlier a composite index created 
by summing the scores of these three categories will be an 18-point scale. Table (2) reports the level 
 
5of institutional achievements for 32 African countries for which data is available over the period 1984-
2000. The period is divided into three sub-periods: the second half of the 1980s, the ﬁrst half of the
1990s and the second half of 1990s (albeit up to 2000). The number of countries for the ﬁrst half of the
1990s is 31 because Namibia is added to the database in 1990. In view of the slow changing nature of 
institutions such choice of sub-periods is not unreasonable. 
  The distribution of countries, for each period, is looked at in terms of four ranges of the 
scores of the composite measure. According to ICRG “brief guide to the rating system” of May 2000 
countries are classiﬁed as “very high risk” if they have a composite score which less than 50% of the
total scores, and are classiﬁed as “very low risk” if they have a composite score of 80% or more of
the total score. In what follows we interpret “high risk” as “low quality institutions” and “low risk” as 
“high quality institutions”. In between rating categories include high risk (with risk points of 0.5-0.6 
of total score), moderate risk (0.6-0.7), and, low risk (0.7-0.8). In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa no 
high quality institutions are reported for any country out of the 32 countries for which information is 
available so that the table includes only four risk categories. 
Table (2): The Distribution of Sub-Saharan African Countries According to the Quality of 
Institutions (averages of total sores on law and order, bureaucratic quality and corruption; 
maximum score is 18 ) 
Details 1984-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 
Very Low Quality (less than 8): 







Low Quality (8 – 9.6): 







Moderate Quality (9.6-11.2): 















 Source: compiled from PRS.
  From the table comparing 1995-2000 with the 1984-1989 it seems like a fair comment to note 
that the quality of institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa did not change in a signiﬁcant fashion. Indeed a
slight deterioration could be detected on account of the fact that the number of countries with low and 
very low quality of institutions increased from 27 in the ﬁrst period to 29 in the last period.
  At the level of details the countries with high quality institutions are Botswana (with a score 
of 11.9) and South Africa (11.8) during the ﬁrst period; Botswana (11.4) during the second period;
and Namibia (12.3) during the last period. The countries with the lowest quality of institutions are 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire; with a score of 1.7) and Liberia (2.8) for the ﬁrst
period; Liberia (1.3) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1.7) for the second period; and, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (2.4), Liberia (2.8), and Somalia (2.9) for the last period.
c) Composite Measures: In addition to the above measures, recent research proposed a method for 
constructing aggregate institutional and governance indicators that incorporate more directly relevant 
measures of institutional quality (see, for example, Kaufmann et al (1999-a and b)). The method is 
based on a compilation of a large data set from 13 specialized agencies that monitor various aspects 
of institutions of governance covering 155 to 173 countries all over the world5. Deﬁning governance
as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”, the major aspects of 
governance are identiﬁedtoinclude:(a)theprocessbywhichgovernmentsareselected,monitoredand
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
and (c) the respect of citizens, and the state, for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interaction.
6  A total of 31 indicators are organized in six clusters corresponding to the three major aspects of 
governance noted above. The governance process has two clusters called “voice and accountability” 
and “political instability and violence”; the capacity of the government has two clusters called 
“government effectiveness” and “regulatory burden”; and, the respect for the rule of law has two 
clusters called “rule of law” and “graft”. The “voice and accountability” cluster includes a number 
of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, political rights and 
independence of the media. As such, therefore, this cluster measures the extent to which citizens of 
a country are able to participate in the selection of governments and are able to monitor, and hold 
accountable, those in authority. The “political instability and violence” cluster combines several 
indicators  that  measure  the  perception  of  the  likelihood  of  destabilization  and  overthrow  of   
governments by unconstitutional or violent means.
  The “government effectiveness” cluster combines indicators that measure the quality of public 
service, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and, the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. All 
of the indicators involved are based on perceptions. The ‘regulatory burden” cluster includes variables 
that measure the extent of government’s imposed distortions as embodied in various policies. 
  The “rule of law” cluster includes indicators that measure the extent to which citizens have 
conﬁdence in the rules devised by society and the extent to which they abide by such rules. As such
the indicators include perceptions on the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of 
the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. The cluster on “graft” measures perceptions on 
corruption in the sense of the exercise of public power for private gain.
  The data from the various sources was reprocessed so that higher values correspond to better 
outcomes (e.g. stronger rule of law and less corruption). Moreover, each indicator is re-scaled by 
subtracting the minimum possible and dividing by the difference between the maximum and minimum 
score so that each indicator is on a scale from zero to one6. Using an econometric model to organize the 
data from the various sources, and with an appropriate choice of measurement units, a standardization 
procedure is followed such that the estimate of the distribution of each governance indicator has a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and the value of the governance indicator would range 
from about –2.5 to about 2.5, where higher values correspond to better outcomes. 
  The composite measure was ﬁrst constructed for 1997/98 but extended to 2000/2001 in
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). A recent important contribution to empirical growth 
literature uses a “composite indicator of a number of elements that capture the protection afforded 
to property rights as well as the strength of the rule of law. This is a standardized measure that 
varies between –2.5 (weakest institutions) and 2.5 (strongest institutions)” (Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2004: 138)). In the draft version of their paper the authors noted that the advantage of the rule 
of law measure “is that it is available for a larger sample of countries, and in principle captures more 
elements that go toward determining institutional quality”. 
  Table (3) reports the distribution of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries according to the averages 
for  the years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, where ﬁgures between brackets are the average scores.
Recalling that the mean of each indicator is zero the ranges over which SSA countries are distributed 
starts with the category of “more than zero” to cater for countries with “better than average” levels of 
institutions.
7Table (3) : The Distribution of Sub-Saharan African Countries According to Composite 
Indicators (average standardized scores)
Institutional Measure More than 0 -0.5 to 0 -1.0 to – 0.5 -1.5 to –1.0 Less than –1.5
Government Effectiveness 5 (0.386) 13 (-0.254) 19 (-0.730) 6 (-1.159) 4 (-1.782)
Regulatory Quality 6 (0.342) 20 (-0.242) 13 (-0.690) 5 (-1.194) 3 (-2.259)
Rule of Law 4 (0.690) 16 (-0.305) 18 (-0.717) 5 (-1.253) 4 (-1.625)
Control of Corruption 7 (0.357) 14 (-0.316) 18 (-0.775) 7 (-1.218) 1 (-1.563)
Political Stability 15 (0.508) 10 (-0.180) 10 (-0.690) 5 (-1.272) 7 (-1.899)
Voice and Accountability 11 (0.522) 11 (-0.300) 10 (-0.782) 12 (-1.241) 3 (-1.628)
Source: Compiled from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002).
  The table clearly conﬁrms that the overwhelming majority of SSA countries is characterized
by weak institutions in the sense of average scores less than zero. The majority ranges from a high 
of about 91.5% of the countries for the “Rule of Law” to a low of about 68% of the countries for 
“Political Stability”. The table also shows that SSA countries fare relatively better on measures relating 
to political governance, as reﬂected by “voice and accountability” and “political stability ” compared
to measures dealing with the government capacity (reﬂected by “government effectiveness” and
“regulatory quality”), and the rule of law (reﬂected by the “rule of law” and “control of corruption”).   
2.2. Institutions in Growth Regressions
  At the outset, it is perhaps important to note that over the past twenty years or so a huge 
empirical literature has developed in an attempt to explain the major determinants of long-run economic 
growth. This empirical growth literature, largely developed to understand the determinants of long-
run steady state growth in advanced countries, has identiﬁed at least sixty-two statistically signiﬁcant
explanatory variables inﬂuencing the growth performance of different economies7. The empirical 
framework is one of cross-country panel regressions where economic growth is usually measured 
as the growth rate in per capita GDP averaged over a period of time, usually over half-decades, for 
each country in the regression. Of the identiﬁed sixty-two variables, three explanatory variables have
consistently been reported as signiﬁcant in all studies. These three variables are in the nature of initial
conditions. They include initial real per capita income (reﬂecting the stage of development of the
country and capturing the idea of convergence over long periods of time); initial life expectancy at 
birth (reﬂecting the health dimension of the human capital of the country); and initial primary school
enrolment ratio (reﬂecting the education dimension of human capital). All these initial conditions
are measured at the start of the relevant time period over which per capita GDP growth rates are 
averaged. The remaining 59 explanatory variables can be classiﬁed as belonging to broad categories
of  “regional”, “political”, “institutional”, “religious”, “economic policy”, and “historical” variables. 
Of these only twenty explanatory variables were found to be robust in the sense that their relationship 
to growth remains signiﬁcant in repeated estimation runs with the three initial conditions (see, for
example, Sala-I-Martin (1997); but also see Levine and Renelt (1992))8
8  Apart from technical robustness analysis of the explanatory variables this literature has come 
under close scrutiny by, among others, Collier and Gunning (1999) and Soludo and Kim (2002). 
Collier and Gunning called for more in depth country studies to explain growth episodes by relating 
growth performance to the behavior of micro economic agents, markets and institutions. Soludo and 
Kim (2002), concurring with the need for country studies, noted that the current stage of knowledge 
is that the empirical growth literature has raised more questions than provided answers.
  On a different level, analysis of long time series of growth for a large number of countries 
has recently shown that modern growth performance has passed through a time break separating 
two growth periods, irrespective of the policy stance of countries and their level of development9. 
The years of the break separate a high growth period (post-war period up to the mid 1970s) from 
a low growth period (from the 1970s to the present). In the context of such studies it is found that 
steady state growth is a feature of advanced countries while volatile growth is a characteristic of the 
growth process in developing countries. The “rule of growth in developing countries is that anything 
can happen and often does. The instability of growth rates makes talk of the growth rate almost 
meaningless. Moreover, the enormous volatility of growth around its trend (however deﬁned) means
that even over periods as long as a decade, growth can be dominated by shocks and recovery” (Pritchett 
(2000:247)) 10. 
  Growth and the accompanying structural transformation of economies, it is generally agreed, 
are ultimately driven by investment, learning and innovation. The role of investment in effecting growth 
is facilitated by physical infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, rule of law and solid institutions. 
Thus, according to this view the fundamentals of growth continue to be investment supported by 
solid  institutions  inclusive  of  macroeconomic  management.  Building  relevant  institutions,  it  is 
generally recognized, is part and parcel of the development process. It is also generally recognized 
that institutions evolve over long periods of time in response to the demands of social, political 
and  economic  interactions.  The  evolutionary  processes  involved  are  inﬂuenced by the history
and culture of the societies concerned (see, for example, Landes (1998)). 
  A related literature, also voluminous, attempted to explain the observed differences in income 
levels between richest and poorest nations in the world. “What accounts for these differences, and 
what (if anything) can we do to reduce them? It is hard to think of any question in economics that is 
of greater signiﬁcance, or of greater relevance to the vast majority of the world’s population” (Rodrik,
Sunramanian and Trebbi (2004: 132)). The literature that attempted an answer to the question is 
classiﬁed as belonging to three schools: geography, trade (or integration in the world economy), and
institutions. Geography is a key determinant of climate, endowment of natural resources, disease 
burden, transport costs, and diffusion of knowledge across space. As such, therefore, it has a strong 
inﬂuence on the standard of living of different regions, as measured by per capita GDP11. The “trade or 
integration” school attempts to explain observed differences in GDP per capita between countries by 
the extent to which countries are open to world trade12.  The third school of explanations “centers on 
institutions and in particular the role of property rights and the rule of law. In this view, what matters 
are the rules of the game in a society and their conduciveness to desirable economic behavior” (Rodrik 
et al (2004: 132))13.        
  An important historical inﬂuence on the long-term evolutionary process of institutions has
been the colonial encounter. In a recent contribution Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001: 1370) 
proposed a theory of institutional differences among countries colonized by Europeans.  The theory 
is based on three premises. The ﬁrst is that there were different types of colonization strategies that
created different sets of institutions. Two extreme types of institutions are noted. Extractive institutions, 
that did not introduce much protection for private property nor did they provide for checks against 
government expropriation, occupy the bad end of the spectrum. “In fact, the main purpose of the 
9extractive state was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer”.  At the other 
extreme are colonies where Europeans decided to settle. “The settlers tried to replicate European 
institutions, with strong emphasis on private property and checks against government power”. A 
second premise is that the colonization strategy was inﬂuenced by the feasibility of settlement. “In
places where the disease environment was not favorable to European settlement the formation of the 
extractive state was more likely”. The third premise is that the colonial institutions, erected by the 
colonial state, persisted to the post-colonial period14. For the purposes of cross-country studies, aimed 
at estimating the impact of institutions on economic performance, settler mortality provided a source 
of exogenous variation in institutions15. 
III.  The Link Between Growth, 
  Poverty and Institutions
  The impact of economic growth on poverty is very well established in the theoretical literature 
on the measurement of poverty. In general, any poverty measure (call it P) could be expressed as 
depending on mean consumption expenditure in society, μ, a poverty line, z, and on a measure of 
the underlying inequality in the distribution of consumption, such as the Gini coefﬁcient, θ. Thus, in 
general form any poverty measures can be expressed in the following form: 
  (1)  P = P(μ/z, θ) ; ∂P/ ∂μ < 0;  ∂P/ ∂z > 0; and, ∂P/ ∂θ > 0.
  The theoretical restrictions on the above general form are such that as per capita consumption 
increases (poverty line declines), other things remaining the same, poverty declines. Similarly, as 
inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditure declines, other things remaining the same, 
poverty declines. Note that in this general formulation if the poverty line changes by the same rate of 
change as mean consumption expenditure, other things remaining the same, poverty does not change16. 
Note also that if the poverty line is set as a constant proportion of mean consumption expenditure, then 
poverty changes will only depend on the change in the distribution of consumption expenditure17. 
  Logarithmic differentiation of equation (1) with respect to time, t, gives the rate of change of 
poverty over time, G(P)= [dP/dt[1/t], as composed of two parts: a growth component and a distribution 
component. We have:
   (2)  G(P) = (1 – ε) η G(μ) + ν G(θ)
  Where ε (0 ≤ ε ≤ 1) is the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to income; η (≤ 0) is the 
partial elasticity of the poverty measure with respect to income; and, ν (≥ 0) is the partial elasticity of 
the poverty measure with respect to the Gini coefﬁcient.  
  If it is believed that the inequality in the distribution of consumption, and the poverty line, 
depend on mean consumption expenditure in society, then a powerful, yet simple, relationship between 
poverty and economic growth can be established. Note that in this case the poverty measure will be 
given by:  
  (3)        P = P(μ/z, θ) = P(μ/z(μ), θ(μ)) = P(μ) 
  This relationship says that changes in poverty over time can always be calculated as a product of 
the elasticity of poverty with respect to mean consumption expenditure, after taking into consideration 
changes in the distribution of consumption expenditure, and the rate of change in mean consumption 
expenditure, i.e. the per capita GDP growth rate. The percentage change in poverty over time is given 
by:  
  (4)             G(P) = γ G(μ) 
10  The elasticity involved, γ, is the “growth elasticity of poverty” and it can be estimated or 
calculated. Such a relationship is important for the purposes of investigating whether institutions 
provide a missing link in poverty reduction. 
  The above framework can readily be used to address the current debate on how to characterize 
pro-poor growth.  In a recent paper Kakwani and Pernia (hereinafter KP; 2000) approached the 
question of pro-poor growth from a decomposition methodology perspective. Using our notation the 
KP index for pro-poor growth can be obtained from equation (2), keeping the poverty line constant 
(i.e. ε= 0):
  (5) G(P) = η G(μ) + ν G(θ)
  where, as deﬁned before, η (≤ 0) is the partial elasticity of the poverty measure with respect 
to income; and, ν (≥ 0) is the partial elasticity of the poverty measure with respect to the Gini 
coefﬁcient.  
  Normalizing equation (5) by dividing by the growth rate of income we have:
  (6) [G(P)/ G(μ)] = γ = η + ν [G(θ)/ G(μ)] 
  Where we have used the deﬁnition of the total elasticity of the poverty measure with respect to
mean income, which, as noted before, is the growth elasticity of poverty. Note also that the expression 
[G(θ)/ G(μ)] is the elasticity of the Gini coefﬁcient with respect to income. This can be positive
or negative depending on the stage of development of the country in the inequality-development 
relationship known as the Kuznets curve, which can be denoted by κ. Thus, the growth elasticity of 
poverty is given by: 
  (7) γ = η + νκ
The KP index of pro-poor growth is deﬁned as:
  (8) φ = [γ/η] = [( η + νκ)/ η ] = [1 + (νκ/ η)] 
  KP correctly note that the value of the index will be greater than unity if the expression (νκ/ η) 
is positive, “which means that growth is strictly pro-poor”. KP (2000: 13) suggest ranges for judging 
the degree of pro-poor growth according to the value of the index: 
•  negative values imply that growth is anti-poor (i.e. φ < 0);  
•  positive values that are equal to or less than 0.33 imply that growth is weakly pro-poor 
(i.e. 0 < φ ≤ 0.33); 
•  values in excess of 0.33 and equal to or less than 0.66 imply that growth is moderately 
pro-poor (i.e. 0.33 < φ ≤ 0.66); 
•  values in excess of 0.66 but less than unity imply that growth is pro-poor (i.e. 0.66 < φ ≤1); 
and, 
•  values in equal to, or in excess of, unity imply that growth is highly pro-poor (i.e. φ ≥1).        
  The advantage of our formulation of the KP pro-poor index is that it makes the requirements 
for pro-poor growth very transparent. In this respect note that a value of the pro-poor growth index 
greater than unity requires a negative Kuznets elasticity (i.e. κ ‹ 0) in view of the negativity of the 
partial elasticity of the poverty index with respect to income (i.e. η ‹ 0). This in turn implies that for 
developing countries at the early stages of development growth can never be pro-poor since these 
countries will be on the upward sloping arm of the Kuznets curve!!!  
11  In what sense does the KP methodology provide a deﬁnition of pro-poor growth? Note that
the approach is based on changes in the poverty measures, and in that sense it doesn’t provide any 
additional information, or characterization, of the growth processes involved. Further, note that the 
deﬁnition relies on already known poverty parameters (the elasticity of the poverty measure with
respect to income and the degree of inequality in the distribution of consumption or income). Thus, it 
is not clear whether their characterization is one for the “structural features” of the prevailing poverty 
(i.e. its sensitivity to growth and distribution) or those of the growth process!! 
  Despite our reservations about the nature of the characterization offered by the pro-poor index 
of KP (2001), we believe that it signals an approach to investigating the role of institutions in poverty 
reduction. Such a role could have been inferred from the growth elasticity of poverty. In this respect 
we note that in the above analytical framework all the elasticity magnitudes involved should be taken 
as functions of the fundamental determinants of the poverty measures (i.e. per capita consumption 
expenditure and the Gini coefﬁcient).   
IV. Empirical Evidence 
4.1. Sub-Saharan African Growth
  It is generally recognized that Africa’s growth during the period since independence and up 
to the ﬁrst oil price shock of 1973 was on par with other regions. Since that time, however, economic
growth faltered ﬁrst and then a process of decline started. Thus, for example, during the 1980s per
capita GDP declined by 1.3 percent per annum, a rate that was 5 percentage points below the average 
for all low-income developing countries. During the ﬁrst half of the 1990s the growth situation further
deteriorated such that per capita GDP declined by an annual rate of 1.8 percent per annum, a rate which 
was 6.2 percentage points below the average for the low-income developing countries (Collier and 
Gunning (1999)).       
  In the context of the methodology used to explain long-run growth a large literature has 
developed in an attempt to explain Africa’s differential growth performance. In world samples used in 
the specialized literature a large and signiﬁcantly negative Sub-SaharanAfrican dummy was detected
implying that as far as various standard explanatory variables used SSA was somehow different. As a 
result a new set of studies attempted to devise additional explanatory variables that could explain such 
a dummy. A representative sample of these studies was recently reviewed. Based on the review, ﬁve
sets of variables are identiﬁed as explaining the observed slow growth in the sub-region.These include
“lack of social capital”, “lack of openness to trade”, “deﬁcient public services”, “tropical location and
high risk environment”, and “lack of ﬁnancial depth”. In assessing such evidence three limitations
of the growth regression methodology are noted. First, by focusing on explaining long-term average 
slow growth of the sub-region the methodology misses the deteriorating performance since 1973. 
Such deterioration cannot be explained in terms of initial conditions such as geographical location. 
Second, African growth performance was strongly episodic in nature and as such cannot be captured 
by the practice of averaging variables over long periods of time. An average episode is one of six years 
duration during which per capita GDP would fall by about 25 percent. Third, the standard growth 
regression methodology did not make adequate allowance for the possible neighborhood effects such 
as pursuing growth-oriented policy that bore fruits in a neighboring country (Collier and Gunning 
(1999: 65-75)).      
  Irrespective of its methodological weaknesses the aggregate evidence on the determinants of 
long-run growth is taken to describe the observed environment in Sub-Saharan Africa as one that is 
characterized by intrinsic high risks, high transport costs and trade barriers, low levels of education, 
limited ﬁnancial markets and high regulation.The response of economic agents, and the functioning of
markets, in such an environment are believed to require more analysis with a view of exploring ways 
12and means of regenerating growth. In this respect it has been argued that the African rural households 
responded to the highly risky and volatile environment by “self-insurance through diversiﬁcation,
both within agricultural activities and between agricultural activities and non-agricultural activities. 
They also accumulate assets for consumption smoothing. Both responses are likely to reduce growth, 
the former by lowering mean income and thereby savings, and the latter by the need to keep assets in 
liquid form” (Collier and Gunning (1999: 78)).  
  The response of rural household to an environment that lacked social capital is believed to 
have been detrimental to growth. Social capital, in this analysis, is looked at as composed of civic 
social capital that is generated by the community and public social capital that is generated by the 
government or the state. Civic social capital embodies the economic beneﬁts that accrue from social
interaction in the form of reduced transaction costs that arises from building of trust, of knowledge 
externalities of social networks, and of an enhanced capacity for collective action. Public social capital 
is deﬁned as the institutions of government that facilitate private activity mostly embodied in the “rule
of law”. While it is recognized that African traditional societies were able to devise social institutions 
(kin and village groups) that lowered the costs of moral hazard and adverse selection, their response 
to changing circumstances developed into a constraint on the growth process. In this respect it is 
noted that the persistence of traditional land rights, and the inheritance practices, creates increasing 
divergence in factor endowments that increase the static inefﬁciency costs and thus reducing the
growth rate directly (Collier and Gunning (1999: 80)). 
  The lack of evolution of rural social capital in Africa in a growth-enhancing direction is also 
noted with respect to the development of social networks to deepen the process of social learning 
through interaction and exchange of information. In this respect it is noted that social networks based 
on kin and village groups in Africa continue to be small, intense and closed largely to serve the 
fundamental insurance function that requires almost complete information. Such structure of networks 
is held to be largely inappropriate for the dissemination and exchange of information on various 
innovations related to production methods.         
  In terms of the inadequacy of rural public services the underdevelopment of rural credit markets 
is highlighted as particularly growth retarding. In this respect it is noted that the lack of credit is partly 
due to the lack of collateral (perhaps due to the land tenure systems). The substitutes for collateral 
are interlinked economic transactions (e.g. with the labor market) and high observability. Due to the 
small sizes of the African rural sectors relevant interlinked market transactions are very limited and 
hence rural credit depended heavily on high observablity, which is closely linked to the nature of 
African rural networks noted above, thus resulting in the lack of observed rural credit. Limited credit 
opportunities have consequences for investment strategies, choice of economic activities and rural 
growth. Of particular relevance is the observation that lack of rural credit could result in increased 
rural inequality with a two-class society in which the relatively wealthy farmers have both higher 
incomes and better opportunities for investment, while the poor are trapped in poverty. 
  The above examples of impediments to growth in the rural sector gleaned from available 
evidence at the household level are taken as conﬁrmation to the results reported on the basis of
aggregate cross-country growth regressions. It is noted, however, that a better understanding of the 
constraints to the growth of the rural sector would require more probing of the rural household level 
behavior. Heeding the suggestion of Collier and Gunning (1999) in-depth African country case studies 
have been undertaken for 27 Sub-Saharan African countries in the context of AERC collaborative 
project on “Explaining African Economic Growth”. O’Connell (2004: 15-16) summarized the major 
emerging lessons from these case studies, with emphasis on political economy concerns, as follows: 
13(i)  “when institutions are weak, the ex ante variance of growth- even medium-run growth- 
may be dominated by uncertainty about the quality of the executive”. There is case-study 
evidence to suggest that ethno-regional interests had a profound effect on the growth 
process in a number of SSA countries; 
(ii)  there is case study evidence to suggest that a narrow interest group, occupying power, is 
capable of choosing ex ante growth ruinous policies; 
(iii)  there is case study evidence to suggest that the non-sustainability of rapid growth episodes 
in SSA could be explained in terms of cycles in government expenditure; and, 
(iv)  the “case study evidence suggests that inefﬁcient transfers may be required to ‘buy peace’
when geographically-based polarization is initially high” (O’Connell (2004: 15). There 
are,  however,  cases  where  the  trade-off  between  growth  and  redistribution  has  been 
managed successfully. 
  These lessons ﬁnd support in the cross-country results of Nkurunziza and Bates (2003: 23)
who conclude that “democracy and political stability are good for growth… (but) the impact of tenure 
on growth varies with the level of democracy. Long term authoritarians appear to be better for growth 
than democratically elected politicians who succeed in prolonging their term of ofﬁce”. As usual
Nkurunziza and Bates (2003) used measures of democracy and political stability from existing data 
sets18.   
4.2. Poverty in Sub- Saharan Africa 
  Before proceeding to investigate whether institutions provide a missing link in the growth-
poverty relationship, it is perhaps instructive to appreciate the extent of poverty incidence in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The most recent estimates of poverty by world regions are reported in Chen and 
Ravallion (2004). Drawing on a sample of 454 national sample surveys from 97 countries, poverty 
results are reported for two African sub-regions: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA; with 28 countries and 60 
surveys) and North Africa (as part of the Middle East and North Africa region of the World Bank, 
with 4, out of seven countries, and 12 surveys)19. The results of the absolute poverty approach (i.e. a 
constant poverty line of US$1.08 per person per day in 1993 PPP) for Sub-Saharan Africa as a region 
compared to other regions are reproduced in table (4). 
Table (4): Incidence Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and Developing World Regions (poverty 
line = US$ 1.08) 
              (Head-count Ratios in percentage)
Developing World Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa  41.6 46.3 46.8 44.6 44.1 45.6 45.7 46.4
Middle East and North Africa   5.1   3.8   3.2   2.3   1.6   2.0   2.6   2.4
East Asia 57.7 38.9 28.8 29.6 24.9 16.6 15.7 14.9
China 63.8 41.0 28.5 33.0 28.4 17.4 17.8 16.6
East Asia Excluding China 42.0 33.5 27.0 21.1 16.7 14.7 11.0 10.8
Eastern Europe and Central Asia   0.7    0.5   0.4   0.5   3.7   4.3   6.3   3.6
Latin America and the Caribbean   9.7 11.8 10.9 11.3 11.3 10.7 10.5   9.5
South Asia 51.5 46.8 45.0 41.3 40.1 36.6 32.2 31.3
India 54.4 49.8 46.3 42.1 42.3 42.2 35.3 34.7
South Asia Excluding India 42.2 37.0 41.0 38.7 33.1 19.7 22.9 21.0
Total 40.4 32.8 28.4 27.9 26.3 22.8 21.8 21.1
Total Excluding China 31.7 29.8 28.4 26.1 25.6 24.6 23.1 22.5
Source: Chen and Ravallion (2004: 152, table 3).
14   According to the above results in the early 1980s Sub-Saharan Africa, with a head-count ratio 
of 0.42, ranked as the third highest poverty incidence region all developing world regions; with East 
Asia (a head-count ratios of about 0.58) and South Asia (a head-count ratio of about 0.52) ranking as 
the highest and second highest poverty incidence regions. By 1984, SSA became the second highest 
poverty incidence region (with a head-count ratio of 0.463 compared to 0.468 for South Asia) and by 
1987 it became the highest poverty incidence region. 
  In terms of time trends the results in the table show that for all regions, except for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, poverty incidence declined over time. The reduction in 
the incidence of poverty was most dramatic for East Asia that saw its head-count ratio declining by 
about 43 percentage points from about 0.58 to about 0.15; and, the decline was systematic over the 
time period with a very clear trend. At the other extreme the increase in the incidence of poverty was 
most pronounced Sub-Saharan Africa, albeit not in a systematic fashion. The incidence of poverty 
increased by about 5.2 percentage points between 1981 and 1987, but then declined by about 2.7 
percentage points between 1987 and 1993 before increasing again by 2.3 percentage points between 
1993 and 2001. The second half of the 1990s saw poverty incidence to increase in a systematic 
fashion. The increase in the incidence of poverty was also signiﬁcant in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia that saw its head-count ratio to increase form 0.7% in 1981 to a high of 6.3% in 1999 before 
declining to 3.6% in 2001. Using end-points poverty incidence increased in this region by about 2.9 
percentage points.   
  By the beginning of the Millennium Sub-Saharan Africa was by far the poorest region among 
developing world regions with about 46% of its total population living below a poverty line of 
US$1.08 per person per day in 1993 purchasing power parity. With an international poverty line of 
US$1.08 per person per day applied to all regions and over time, the above poverty estimates can be 
considered as underestimates. With a lot of reluctance Chen and Ravallion (2000) started to report 
poverty estimates after allowing the poverty line to change with the standard of living, and hence to 
vary between regions. Their procedure is to allow the initial poverty line is to change with per capita 
consumption expenditure in each country such that the poverty line would satisfy the US$ 1 a day 
per person as a minimum. Thus, the poverty line is deﬁned as the maximum of (0.33 of consumption
expenditure per person per day and $ 1 per person per day). Following that the poverty line is kept 
constant over time for each country. While in the new Chen and Ravallion (2004) results the relative 
poverty lines are not reported, and in view of the fact that the initial poverty lines are kept constant, 
we report in the table below the Chen and Ravallion (2000) relative poverty lines for illustration 
purposes20.  
Table (5):Incidence of Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 





1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.33 45.93 50.48 51.27 47.61 47.56 48.71 49.66 50.18
Middle East and North Africa 1.78 37.36 33.40 21.80 19.29 17.58 17.16 18.26 16.91
East Asia 1.92 63.15 44.45 33.92 35.31 30.17 21.48 20.86 19.69
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2.71   8.11   7.53   6.41   7.77 22.65 23.17 27.17 21.49
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.31 40.55 45.37 42.34 43.28 44.97 39.39 38.98 39.77
South Asia 1.08 58.17 50.65 47.72 41.45 40.33 36.87 32.09 31.41
Total ----- 50.10 42.00 36.60 35.30 34.90 30.60 29.80 28.80
Source: Chen and Ravallion (2004: 160, table 8) except for the poverty line column which is from Chen and 
                Ravallion (2000: table 5). 
15  Looking at the poverty line column, it is perhaps clear that on average the practice of calculating 
poverty measures on the basis of the international poverty threshold of US$1 per person per day 
grossly underestimates the incidence of poverty in all regions except that of South Asia. The most 
signiﬁcant underestimates are for the Middle East and North Africa region (where the 1981 head-
count ratio needs to be revised upwards by 32.26 percentage points); Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
region (where the 2001 head-count ratio needs to be revised by 17.89 percentage points); and, Latin 
America and the Caribbean region (where the 1981 head-count ratio needs to be revised by 30.85 
percentage points)!! 
  Despite the revisions the ranking of Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the incidence of poverty 
remains as noted above. By the beginning of the Millennium Sub-Saharan Africa was by far the 
poorest region among developing world regions with about 50% of its total population living below a 
poverty line of US$1.33 per person per day in 1993 purchasing power parity21. 
  In addition to the above global estimates of poverty there is evidence to suggest that Sub-
Saharan African poverty is dominated by rural poverty. For a sample of 19 SSA countries for which 
data on the distribution of consumption expenditure is available from World Bank sources Ali (2001-
a) provided detailed estimates, based on country speciﬁc poverty lines, for rural, urban and national
levels. The evidence is summarized as follows:   
(a)  that SSA rural poverty is characterized by a high level of capability deprivation as reﬂected by
educational enrollment ratios, literacy rates, access to sanitation and access to clean potable 
water. Average net primary enrollment ratio is 34% (with variation from a high of 75% to a low 
of 13% only); average net secondary enrollment ratio is 11% (with variation from a high of 38% 
to a low of only 1%); average literacy rate of 37% (with variation from a high of 92% to a low 
of only 4%); average access to sanitation of 41% (with variation from a high of 92% to a low of 
only 5%); and an average access to clean water of only 13% (with variation from a high of 41% 
to a low of only 1%); 
(b) that African rural poverty is wide spread, deep and severe as reﬂected by conventional money
metric measures of the head-count ratio (that ranges from a high of 81%  to a low of 34%), the 
poverty-gap ratio (that ranges from a high of 48% to a low of 8% implying an average income 
of the poor that ranges from a high of US$24 per person per month to a low of about US$10 per 
person per month), and the squared poverty-gap ratio (that ranges from a high of 35% to a low 
of 2%); respectively; 
(c)  that  rural poverty is characterized by its very low response to its fundamental determinants: 
economic growth (as captured by changes in mean consumption expenditure) and the distribution 
of consumption expenditure (as summarized by the Gini coefﬁcient). The absolute value of the
elasticity of the head-count ratio with respect to mean consumption expenditure varies from a 
high of 2.4 to a low of 0.38 while its elasticity with respect to the Gini coefﬁcient varies from a
high of 1.05 to a low of zero for eleven of the countries of the sample. The depth and severity 
of poverty as measured by the poverty-gap ratio and the squared poverty-gap ratio are also 
characterized by relatively low response. One possible interpretation of this is that rural poverty 
is structural in nature; 
(d) that rural poverty dominates African poverty in the sense of its share in total poverty at the 
national level. The share of rural poverty in the incidence of total poverty ranges from a high 
of 91 percent to a low of 62 per cent; its share in the depth of poverty ranges from a high of 93 
percent to a low of 62%; and its share in the severity of poverty ranges from a high of 96 percent 
to a low of 63%; 
16(e)  that a peculiar feature of the African rural sectors is that even its rich are poor in absolute terms. 
The average consumption expenditure of the rural rich varies from a high of US$85 per person 
per month (i.e. US$2.8 per person per day) to a low of US$27 per person per month (i.e. only 90 
cents per person per day); and, 
(f)  that the incidence, depth and severity of African rural poverty do not seem to be responsive to 
macroeconomic policies. This feature, however, needs more investigation as relevant information 
becomes available. 
4.3. The Link Between Institutions and Poverty
  At the outset of this sub-section it may be instructive to note that Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999: 26-27, tables 2 and 3) used the standardized measures in a causal econometric model 
to see the effect of governance on development outcome indicators: per capita GDP, infant mortality 
rate and adult literacy rate. Each governance indicator was found to be a signiﬁcant determinant of
the above development outcomes. In a broad sense each of these development outcome indicators 
can  be  viewed  as  a  poverty  measure.  Table  (6)  summarizes  these  results  which  are  based  on 
a two-stage least squares procedure for a sample of countries that excludes OECD countries22. The 
size of the sample for each governance (institutional) indicator is shown between brackets under 
column titles. In the text of the table ﬁgures between brackets indicate the standard error of estimate.
Table (6) : The Effect of Institutions on Development Outcome Indicators: 
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Source: Kaufmann et al (1999: 26-27, tables 2 and 3).
  As the table shows improved institutions lead to improved development outcomes such that 
it increases per capita income and the adult literacy rate and reduces the infant mortality rate. The 
result relating to per capita GDP is particularly relevant to an investigation seeking to explore the 
“missing link” in the relationship between growth and poverty. According to the authors, recalling that 
the standard deviation of governance across countries is equal to one, “the coefﬁcient on governance
can be interpreted as the 100x(eβ - 1)-percent increase in per capita incomes due to a one-standard 
deviation improvement in governance”. Thus, for example, the ﬁrst row of the table indicates that a
one-standard deviation improvement in institutions leads to between 1.4-fold (in case of regulatory 
quality) to 6.9-fold (in case of the rule of law) increase in per capita GDP. “These results clearly 
indicate that there is a large payoff in terms of per capita income to improvements in governance” 
(Kaufmann  et al (1999: 15-16)). 
17  The above results, and other similar results, may be used in the context of the framework of 
the fundamental determinants of poverty provided by equation (3) to infer the relationship between 
poverty and institutions. A more direct approach, however, would try to estimate the relationship 
directly to explore the link. Table (7) provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used.































































































































































Mean 55.14 2504 -0.36 -0.20 -0.30 -0.36 -0.31
Standard deviation 23.70 2010 0.51 0.63 0.60 0.51
Maximum 98 9695 0.95 1.28 1.19 1.19 1.15
Minimum 6 216 -1.78 -2.40 -1.73 -1.85 -1.87
Number of countries 108 94 107 107 100 89 107
  In table (8) we report a set of preliminary results of such an approach where we use a sample of 
developing countries for which head-count ratios are reported in Dollar and Kraay (2001). The head-
count ratios are estimated on the basis of an international poverty line of US$2 per person per day for 
the mid-1990s. We use as our measure of institutions the average of four of the standardized measures 
for 1996 from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002): government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. We also use per capita GDP in PPP international dollars 
of 1985.
Table (8): Institutions and Poverty
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7











Rule of Law (RL)
-0.2554 
(3.05)*
Control of Corruption (CC) -0.2015 
(2.16)**




















R-squared 0.4509 0.0739 0.0437 0.0733 0.0401 0.0730 0.4744
F-statistics 75.5380 8.3733 4.7965 7.7477 3.6365 8.2692 26.7808
Number of Observations 94 107 107 100 89 107 93
18  The ﬁrst column of the above table reports the original relationship between poverty and the
level of income as per equation (3) in the analytical framework. As is expected growth will reduce 
poverty. In this speciﬁcation the growth elasticity of poverty increases is higher in absolute value for
higher levels of income (and is given by γ = -0.00016 y). Note that per capita GDP explains about 
45% of the variations in observed poverty among the countries of the sample. Per capita GDP being a 
fundamental determinant of poverty, this result should not be surprising.  
  As expected the above results show that improvements in institutions are expected to reduce 
poverty in a statistically signiﬁcantfashion.Thisholdstrueforeachmeasureofinstitutions(columns2-
5) as well as for the composite measure (column 6). The explanatory power of each, and the composite, 
measure, however, is very low. This suggests that perhaps institutions exert their effect on poverty 
through the mediation of other channels. An obvious channel is the level of development as reﬂected
by per capita GDP. In the last column this effect is explored by using an interaction term. The results 
show that the power of explanation of the model now increases signiﬁcantly, largely due to taking
into account per capita GDP as a fundamental determinant of the spread of poverty, as already noted. 
Moreover, the results show that the relationship between improvement in institutions and poverty 
depends on the stage of development. Thus, it can be shown that improvements in institutions tend to 
reduce poverty up to a per capita GDP level of $4329, thereafter poverty may increase.    
V. Implications for NEPAD  
  We now turn to the implications of the above results for the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD)23. According to its website NEPAD is a “vision and a strategic framework” 
for Africa’s renewal”. The primary objectives of NEPAD are enumerated to include the eradication of 
poverty; the achievement of sustainable growth and development; and the halting of the marginalization 
of the continent in the global economy. 
  Important for the purposes of this paper is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
deﬁned as an “instrument voluntarily acceded to by member states of the AU as an African self-
monitoring  mechanism”.  The  primary  purpose  of APRM  is  to  “foster  the  adoption  of  policies, 
standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development 
and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful 
and best practice, including identifying deﬁciencies and assessing the needs of capacity building”.
The policies, standards and practices that are to be adopted are supposed to cover the four major areas 
identiﬁed in the base document ofAPRM and the declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and
Corporate Governance endorsed by the inaugural Summit of AU. The four areas are: “democracy 
and political governance”; “economic governance and management”; “corporate governance”; and, 
“socio-economic development”.  To facilitate the measuring of performance and progress in the 
four areas the Technical Secretariat of APRM  (hereinafter TSAPRM; 2003) proposed a framework 
composed of key objectives, standards (meaning the agreements and conventions signed by member 
states that provide the political and institutional basis for the objectives), criteria (to facilitate judgment 
on whether the country has taken the necessary steps to achieve the objectives), and indicators (i.e. 
the means by which it is determined whether the criteria have been met). Without getting involved in 
detailed discussion table (9) summarizes the content of TSAPRM framework.   
 















Consolidate  a  constitutional 
political order in which democracy, 
respect  for  human  rights,  the 
rule  of  law,  the  separation  of 
powers, and effective, responsive 
public  service  are  realized.   




Establish good economic 
governance and management. 5 15 16 15
Corporate 
Governance
Align the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society within a 
framework  of  sound  governance 
and common good.
5 8 6 10
Socio-Economic 
Development
Eradication of poverty and 
fostering of socio-economic 
development.
6 12 20 27
Source: own compilation from TSAPRM (2003).
  Despite being classiﬁed as an overall objective of a NEPAD priority area the NEPAD literature
clearly states that the “eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development” are 
“the overarching twin objectives” of development in the continent. In this sense it will be reasonable 
to suggest that the other three areas are considered by NEPAD as “preconditions and foundations of 
sustainable development and the eradication of poverty” (TSAPRM (2003: 5))24. A careful reading 
of the details of the three areas of “political governance”, “economic governance and management” 
and “corporate governance” will show that they deal with improving the institutional structure of the 
continent. Indeed it can easily be shown that the 19 key objectives of the three areas can be mapped 
into the six governance clusters of the composite index of institutions.  A summary of such mapping 
is given in table (10) where NEPAD key objectives are identiﬁed by the numbers given to them
in TSAPRM (2003) and where the ﬁrst number is that for the NEPAD area of priority. As per our
understanding the key objectives of the fourth area are not included in the mapping. Note that NEPAD 
key objective (2.3) on “promoting sound public ﬁnance management” appears, for obvious reasons,
under the capacity of the government as well as under the rule of law and corruption.  
Table (10): Mapping NEPAD Key Objectives into the Composite Index of Institutions
Major Aspect of Governance Governance Clusters NEPAD Key Objectives
Process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced
(i) Voice and accountability.
(ii) Political Stability.
1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 1.4; 1.7; 1.8; 1.9; 3.b; 
3.d.
Capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies
(i)  Government effectiveness.
(ii) Regulatory quality.
1.5; 2.1; 2.2; 2.3; 3.a; 3.c.
Respect of citizens, and the state, for 
the institutions that govern economic 
and social interaction.
(i)  Rule of law.
(ii) Corruption.
1.4; 1.6; 2.3; 2.4; 3.e.
      20  Given the above mapping it is perhaps reasonable to suggest that NEPAD aims at improving 
the institutional structures in the continent in order to achieve the overarching goal of socio-economic 
development of eradication of poverty. Indeed the details of the key objectives in the fourth priority 
area conﬁrm that none of them falls into the clusters of the composite index of institutions.According
to TSAPRM (23-28) the six key objectives of the fourth priority area are: 
(i)  “promote  self-reliance  in  development  and  build  capacity  for  self-  sustaining 
          development; 
(ii)  “accelerate socio-economic development to achieve sustainable development and poverty 
          eradication”; 
(iii)  “strengthen policies, delivery mechanisms and outcomes in key social development areas 
          (including education and combating of  HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases); 
(iv)  “ensure affordable access to water, sanitation, energy, ﬁnance (including micro-ﬁnance),
          markets and ICT to all citizens, especially the rural poor”; 
(v)  “progress towards gender equality, particularly equal access to education for girls at all 
          levels; and, 
(vi)  “encourage broad-based participation in development by all stakeholders at all levels”.  
  In view of the above, the NEPAD initiative can be looked at as based on the assumption that 
improving institutions will lead to poverty reduction in the continent. However, our results clearly 
show that “institutions” as conventionally measured are not likely to have a major impact on poverty 
reduction and that their most inﬂuential impact is probably mediated through income via the growth
process. Moreover, in view of the fact that SSA poverty is dominated by rural poverty a search needs 
to be mounted to identify, understand and enhance institutions relevant to the rural sector rather than 
to the overall national levels. This, of course, does not mean that the type of institutions identiﬁed by
NEPAD are not important in their own right.          
VI. Concluding Remarks 
  Do institutions provide the missing link between growth and poverty? Or alternatively, is there 
a missing link between growth and poverty? In this paper, after reviewing the various deﬁnitions of
“institutions” as a variable used in growth regressions, we argued that from an analytical perspective 
there does not exist a missing link between growth and poverty reduction. Further, from an empirical 
point of view it is shown that while improvements in institutions, as expected, do reduce poverty in a 
statistically signiﬁcant fashion, their explanatory power is weak.  
  Taking into account the historical roots of current institutions, there is general agreement that 
perhaps the most important institutions to be built, or to strengthen where they exist, include property 
rights, regulatory institutions, economic management institutions, institutions for social insurance, 
and institutions for conﬂict management. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),
it is argued, can be seen as an attempt to reform the inherited weak institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is these weak institutions that have failed to effect the development process in Africa in the sense of 
sustaining a growth process that reduces poverty. 
21  Despite this, however, it needs to be noted that most of the deﬁnitions of “institutions” used in
the literature revolve around the idea that “political institutions of limited government cause economic 
growth”. Central to this idea is the underlying notion of secured property rights that are supposed to 
provide the right incentives to entrepreneurs to accumulate and innovate by ensuring adequate control 
over the return to the assets that they produce or improve. According to Rodrik (1999-b: 3)  “the key 
word is ‘control’ rather than ‘ownership’. Formal property rights do not count for much if they do not 
confer control rights”. In this respect it is also noted that establishing property rights is not simply a 
matter of passing legislation. “Legislation in itself is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for the provision
of the secure property rights. In practice, control rights are upheld by a combination of legislation, 
private enforcement, and custom and tradition” (Rodrik (1999-b: 3))25.  
  Given Africa’s colonial encounter secured property rights continue to be a major, vexing, 
issue in rural areas. The root of the difﬁculty seems to lie in the deﬁnition of land as a customary
possession. This is a legacy of late colonialism where “the general rule was that land could not be a 
private possession, of either landlords or peasants. It was deﬁned as a customary communal holding,
to which every peasant household had a customary access, deﬁned by state-appointed customary
authorities” (Mamdani (1996: 22)). The institutional complications in this deﬁnition of “property
rights” in the African rural areas relate to three related consequences of the all-embracing world of 
the customary. The ﬁrst is that customary “law was deﬁned in the plural, as the law of the tribe, and
not in the singular, as the law for all natives. Thus, there was not one customary law for all natives, 
but roughly as many sets of customary laws as there were said to be tribes” (Mamdani (1996: 22)). 
The second consequence is that the concept of the “customary” was bestowed on the monarchical, 
authoritarian and patriarchal African ruling arrangements at the time which were arrangements with 
the least historical depth. Customary law was administratively driven in the sense that those who 
enforced custom were in a position to deﬁneitintheﬁrstplace.Thethird,andimportant,consequence
is that because land was deﬁned as a customary possession the market was only a partial institution.
Beyond the market, only the use of force was available to draw land and labor out of the world of the 
“customary”. 
  The persistence of the colonial institutions to the post-independence state in Africa preserved 
the world of the “customary” due to the failure to dismantle and reorganize the local state in the 
rural areas as a genuine democratization shift. If the “customary” was deﬁned in the plural to refer
to tribes, real or contrived, then building relevant development institutions in the rural areas would 
need as a ﬁrst step a move to detribalize the local state in the rural areas. In this process, and given the
history, it will probably be a mistake to equalize the “customary” with the “indigenous”. In the spirit 
of popular participation both the “customary” and the “indigenous” should be left to be deﬁned by the
rural people themselves. Once this is done the relevant “property rights” will emerge as they do in an 
evolutionary sense26. 
  In addition to the above,  it needs to be noted that in view of the wide spread poverty in 
SSA and, in view of the fact that such poverty is dominant in the rural sectors of the continent, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that perhaps the institutional content of NEPAD is a shade lacking in 
terms of identifying the institutional prerequisites for poverty reduction in the continent. NEPAD 
lacks emphasis on institutions for social insurance. There is now an emerging agreement that such 
institutions are needed to cater for the protection of the poor during economic crises27.  
  Contrary to previous concerns about the central importance of ﬁscal prudence in designing
macroeconomic policy packages an emerging consensus sees setting-up effective safety nets for the 
poor as a long-term investment in institutions. This consensus is based on lessons drawn from past 
country experience. Two major, and related, lessons have been emphasized. The ﬁrst lesson is that
safety net mechanisms, when they exist, are too often inadequate. This is especially true in rural 
Africa where informal, family-based or kin-based, safety nets have been weakened by natural as 
22well as man-made disasters (e.g. droughts and civil conﬂicts respectively). When formal safety nets
exist their coverage is often limited, the resources available to provide assistance are very limited, the 
leakage of beneﬁts is high, and the poor are too often residual claimants due to unawareness or lack
of empowerment. The second lesson is that safety nets are best set-up during good times rather than 
at times of crises (Ferreira et al (2000: 10)).        
  In advocating safety nets as crucial to any development strategy that aims at reducing poverty 
it is recognized that the comparative advantage of these mechanisms is that they provide a more 
cost effective insurance for the poor against income losses. Traditional insurance mechanisms, by 
comparison, entail high costs to long-term progress of the poor especially in the struggle to escape 
poverty. In the context of a rural development strategy public safety nets can easily be incorporated 
as an integral development component. 
  While the design of public safety nets will vary from one each country to another, given country 
circumstances, experience has shown that two central elements of such mechanisms are public work 
programs and public transfer programs. Public work programs are expected to provide employment 
for those who are able to work, while the transfer programs are expected to provide support to those 
who can not, or should not, work.       
  Be the above as it may, the results of this paper suggest three major areas for further research. 
The ﬁrst area drives from the analytical framework and is closely related to the overarching objective
of poverty reduction in NEPAD and the MDGs. If, as in the ﬁrst MDG, a quantitative goal for poverty
reduction is speciﬁed (e.g. reducing poverty by half by a given date) then clearly the required per
capita growth rate will depend on the growth elasticity of poverty. Under such a strategy it may be 
important to look at the effect of institutions, over and above their effect through the growth process, 
in changing the responsiveness of poverty to growth. This requires more work on exploring the effect 
of institutions on the growth elasticity of poverty. 
  A second area that needs further investigation is the nature and pattern of change of institutions 
in the traditional, rural, sectors. Given the dominance of rural poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa there is a 
need to look at whether traditional institutions play a role in the persistence of poverty. Closely linked 
to this is the third area of investigating the nature of traditional safety nets and their role in poverty 
reduction.     
Footnotes
1    In  a  recent  contribution  Glaeser,  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes  and  Shleifer  (2004:  275)  note  that      the  key 
word in North’s deﬁnition is the word “constraints” , thus “constitutions and electoral rules are good examples of
institutions, but good policies chose by dictators who have a free hand are not”. Moreover, they note that another 
essential aspect of institutions is that the constraints “need to be reasonably permanent or durable”.  
2  The  other  MDGs  deal  with  increasing  he  coverage  of  primary  education,  promoting  gender  equality 
and  the  empowerment  of  women,  reducing  child  mortality,  improving  maternal  health,  combating  HIV/
AIDS  and  other  diseases,  ensuring  environmental  sustainability,  and  forging  a  global  partnership  for 
development.  Except  for  the  last  goal,  which  is  organizational  in  nature,  all  of  the  other  goals  can 
be taken as related to a broader concept of “poverty” in a sense of capability deprivation ala Sen. 
3     See, for example, Ali (2001-b) and Collier and Dollar (2001). 
234  The World Bank has an internal measure called “country policy and institutional assessment”, denoted CPIA. The measure 
is based on assessing the situation in a given country on four broad categories, each with a number of components, with 
20 total components. Each component “is rated ordinally by country specialists, on a scale of 1-6, using standardized 
criteria” (Collier and Dollar (2002: 1477-8)). All components are equally weighted and a simple average of all components 
gives the CPIA that can be normalized. See Collier and Dollar (2002: 1498, table 8) for details of the components. For a 
critical review of the use of these measures in political economy of governance literature see Keefer (2004).      
5 The sources used are: Business Environment Risk Intelligence; Wall Street Journal; Standard and Poors; European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Economist Intelligence Unit; Freedom House; Gallup International; World 
Economic Forum; Heritage Foundation; Political Economic Risk Consultancy;  Political Risk Services; Institute of 
Management Development; and, World Bank. 
 
6 This has become a common method to standardize indicators. Thus if we denote an indicator by I and its normalized value 
by I* then the normalized value is given by the following: I* = [I – Imin]/ [Imax – Imin]. 
 
7  According to Barro (1998: 8) the framework for the determination of growth can be written as Dy =f(y, y*), where Dy is 
the growth rate of per capita output, y is the current level of per capita output and y* is the long-run or steady state level 
of per capita output. The growth rate is diminishing in y, given y*, and increasing in y*, given y. The steady state level 
of per capita output, y*, depends on an array of choice and environmental variables.
 
8  For an excellent, non-technical, summary of the empirical growth literature as it relates to developing countries see 
Easterly (2001-a). 
9  See, for example, Ben-David and Papell (1995, 1998) and Pritchett (2000). 
10 A relevant ﬁnding in this respect is that of Easterly (2001-b) where it is noted that despite improvements in the policy
stance indices of a large number of developing countries over the period 1960-1994, especially in the context of policy-
based lending that started in the 1980s, a lot of these countries stagnated. A possible explanation of the stagnation of 
a number of countries despite improvement in policy is external shocks emanating from the slow-down of growth in 
advanced countries. 
11 See, for example, Diamond (1997), Landes (1998) and Sachs (2000). 
12 Important contributions in this school include Frankel and Romer (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
13 Rodrik et al (2004) tested the propositions of the three schools by estimating a model of the form log y = μ + α R +β T 
+ γ G + ε,  where R is a measure of institutions, T is trade (or integration), and G is a measure of geography.  Two-stage 
least squares are used where in the ﬁrst stage R and T are treated s endogenous depending on appropriate instruments for
earlier institutions (settler mortality) and trade and G. 
 
14 See also Mamdani (1996:19) who argues that the colonial state in Africa was “a double-sided affair. Its one side, the state 
that governed a racially deﬁned citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights. Its other
side, the state that ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively driven justice”. 
 
15 Acemoglu et al (2001) estimated an equation of the form log yi = μ + α Ri + X  i γ + ε  i , where y is income per 
capita, R is a measure of current institutions, X is an appropriately deﬁned vector of other variables. The equation
is estimated by two-stage least squares where the measure of current institutions, R, is modeled in the following 
fashion: R = ζ + β log M + X δ + ν ;  where M is a measure of settler mortality. The interest of the estimation 
 is on α. 
   
16  This  is  the  property  of  zero  homogeneity  of  the  poverty  measure  with  respect  to  mean 
consumption expenditure and the poverty line. This property is thought to hold for most of the widely used poverty 
measures.
2417  This  can  easily  be  established  by  direct  substitution  in  equation  (5).  Setting  the  poverty  line  as 
a proportion of he standard of living (e.g. median income) is the common practice in Europe (see Atkinson (1998). 
18  See  also  O’Connell  and  Ndulu  (2000:  39,  table  5.3.1)  who  ﬁnd that political instability has a
 negative and signiﬁcant effect on per capita GDP growth.
 
19  SSA  countries  in  the  sample  are:  Botswana  (2  surveys);  Burkina  Faso  (2),  Burundi  (2),  Cameron 
(1), Central African Republic (1), Cote d’Ivoire (4), Ethiopia (3), Gambia (2), Ghana (3), Kenya (3), Lesotho (3), 
Madagascar (3), Mali (2), Malawi (1) Mauritania (4), Mozambique (1), Namibia (1), Niger (2), Nigeria (3), Rwanda (1), 
Senegal (2), Sierra Leone (1), South Africa (3), Swaziland (1), Tanzania (1), Uganda (4), Zambia (4), and, Zimbabwe 
(2). 
20    In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa the case for the relative poverty line has een made by Professor 
Thorbecke and myself in a number of contributions in the context of AERC collaborative project on “Poverty, Income 
Distribution and Labor Markets”  that was launched in 1997.  See, for example, Ali and Thorbecke (2000) and 
Thorbecke and Mwabu (2003).
21    Our  own  estimates  using  a  sample  of  19  SSA  countries  for  which  data  for  the  1990s  is  available 
and using country speciﬁc poverty lines gives an estimate of an average head-count ratio of 55.6%. The estimated
head-count ratio varied from a low of about 31% for Ghana (for a poverty line of $32 per person per month) to a high 
of about 83% of the population for Ethiopia (with a poverty line of about $24 per person per month). Thorbecke and 
Mwabu (2003) report head-count ratios based on case studies for the second half of the 1990s that range from a low of 
35% for Uganda in 2000 to a high of 82% for Mozambique for 1997/98.    
22  The  2SLS  is  used  to  take  into  account  possible  reverse  causality  between  governance  and  income 
level, omitted variable biases, and measurement errors.
23  NEPAD  was  initiated  by  the  heads  of  state  of  Algeria,  Egypt,  Nigeria,  Senegal  and  South  Africa 
on a mandate from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The 37th Summit of the OAU, held in July 2001, formally 
adopted the strategic framework document. NEPAD is now a programme of the African Union (AU), the successor 
organization to OAU. The inaugural Summit of AU as held in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The highest authority 
of NEPAD is the heads of state and government Summit of AU. There is a heads of state and government Implementation 
Committee (3 states per region) that reports to the AU Summit on an annual basis and there is a steering committee 
that oversees the development of projects and programmes. In addition a NEPAD’s Secretariat that coordinates the 
implementation of approved projects and programmes. 
24   For a similar understanding of NEPAD’s goals see Funke and Nsouli (2003).
25  The  development  experience  of  Taiwan,  South  Korea  and  China  is  usually  invoked  as  evidence  in 
this context; see Glaeser et al (2004).
26  Soludo (2000: 15) poses the question “do indigenous land rights constrain agricultural investment 
and productivity?” and cites evidence that shows that “indigenous tenure systems have been ﬂexible and responsive to
changing economic circumstances”. In this respect it may be useful to note that these “indigenous” systems could be 
referring to “customary” land systems. 
 
27  In a recent report UNECA (2005: vii) identiﬁed ten good governance priorities. Nine of these are
conventional in nature but the on “maximizing the contribution of traditional modes of governance” is relevant to 
social safety nets. The report notes that given “the enduring vital role of traditional modes of authority in many areas 
of the continent, particularly in communities, it is important to constantly ﬁnd ways to increase their efﬁcacy in the
modern setting. Traditional systems can complement the resources of government in providing such services as health, 
education and infrastructure”.   
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